The African Union's Leadership Deficit in Peace and Economic Deals
It is Time for the African Union to Step Up on Peace and Governance
Introduction
In July 2025, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) government and the M23 rebel group signed a landmark ceasefire declaration in Doha, Qatar – far from African soil and under the auspices of a Middle Eastern mediator. While the agreement brought hope for peace in war-torn eastern DRC, it also underscored a troubling pattern: the African Union (AU) was largely absent from the negotiating table. The AU did issue praise afterward – calling the Doha declaration a “significant development” and a “major milestone” toward stability in the Great Lakes region. – but that belated endorsement only highlighted how the heavy lifting had been done by others. This scenario has become emblematic of a broader issue across the continent. From protracted conflicts to political crises, the AU often appears disengaged or reactive, ceding leadership to external actors and weakening its own credibility. In this opinion piece, we argue that the African Union must shore up its credibility by proactively taking responsibility for peacekeeping and promoting responsible governance in Africa. The AU’s founding vision of “African solutions to African problems” is at stake, and the time has come for Africa’s paramount body to step up and lead.
AU Missing in Action: Peace Deals Without African Leadership
The DRC-M23 deal brokered in Qatar exemplifies the leadership vacuum the AU has left in some of Africa’s most urgent peace processes. After months of heavy fighting in eastern Congo that killed thousands and displaced many more, it was Qatar’s diplomacy – not the AU’s – that finally brought the combatants to direct talks. In March 2025, Qatari mediators hosted a surprise meeting between DRC President Félix Tshisekedi and Rwandan President Paul Kagame, securing their commitment to an “immediate and unconditional” ceasefire. This breakthrough paved the way for negotiations with the Rwanda-backed M23 rebels, whom Kinshasa had long refused to even meet. By mid-July, Doha witnessed both sides signing principles to end the fighting and start formal peace talks by August. Though some saw that agreement as fragile it nevertheless is an achievement. Noticeably absent from these developments was any high-profile AU mediation effort. In fact, Angola – which had been leading an AU-backed “Luanda Process” since 2022 to resolve the DRC crisis – bowed out of its mediation role upon assuming the AU’s rotating chairmanship, citing a need to focus on broader priorities. This created a void that was eagerly filled by outside players. “Could the AU be relinquishing its role as Africa’s primary conflict mediator amid the rising interests of external players?” one policy forum pointedly asked citing “meddling” but that would not be a fair characterisation. The involvement of Qatar – a non-African actor – in Congo’s peace process “signals a growing trend of external intervention in African conflicts” and “exposes the deficiencies” of the continent’s own conflict-resolution mechanisms.
Sadly, the Congolese peace talks are not an isolated case. Across Africa, key peace deals and ceasefire negotiations often unfold with minimal AU leadership. In Libya’s civil war, for example, the AU’s voice was drowned out by Middle Eastern and European powers. In Sudan’s ongoing conflict, initial ceasefire talks were convened by the US and Saudi Arabia in Jeddah, while the African Union struggled to assert a lead role. Even in regions where the AU did mandate missions or envoys – such as the Sahel or the Horn of Africa – coordination problems and resource gaps have hampered effectiveness. The AU’s Peace and Security Council (PSC) frequently defers to sub-regional bodies, but overlapping regional initiatives can create confusion and sideline the continental body. In the eastern DRC case, parallel efforts by the East African Community (EAC) and others “minimised the AU’s direct influence” on the outcome. Without a strong guiding hand from the AU to streamline these efforts, diplomatic initiatives become fragmented, and opportunistic outside interests find their way in. Analysts warn that external mediation, if not well managed, “can lead to” meddling and undermine African-led solutions. In short, when the AU fails to take the lead, it leaves a vacuum that outsiders are all too ready to fill – not always in the best interest of Africa.
It is little wonder, then, that the AU has faced sharp criticism for its lack of robust leadership on major crises. Observers note that on conflicts ranging from DR Congo to the wars in Sudan, the Anglophone crisis in Cameroon, and instability in the Sahel, the African Union often appears a step behind. Instead of proactively driving peace processes, the AU is seen issuing communiqués from the sidelines or reacting after other actors have set the agenda. This perception of disengagement erodes the AU’s credibility as the continent’s peace broker. Africans expect the AU to rise to these challenges – to coordinate swift, bold responses and speak with a collective voice – but too often, the response has been tepid or disjointed. The result has been a crisis of confidence in African multilateral peace efforts. Even some peace operations deployed in Africa have faltered prematurely; in recent years, missions like the EAC’s regional force in DRC and the SADC mission in Mozambique had to end early without achieving their goals. This trend “signified a broader crisis of confidence in multilateral peacekeeping and peace support operations” on the continent. When violent conflicts rage on and flagship AU goals like “Silencing the Guns” by 2020 go unmet, it sends a signal that Africa’s leaders are not doing enough to solve African problems. Every conflict left to fester or outsourced to foreign mediation is a blow to the AU’s standing before its own citizens.
The Governance Gap: Credibility Eroded by Inaction on Democracy
Peace and security are only one side of the African Union’s mandate. The other is promoting responsible governance and democratic norms among member states. Here, too, the AU’s credibility has been undermined by inaction and inconsistency. On paper, the AU has laudable principles: it rejects unconstitutional changes of government and upholds standards for free and fair elections. In practice, however, the organization has often been reluctant to confront leaders who violate those principles. This hesitancy has not gone unnoticed by Africans, many of whom question whether the AU truly stands for the democratic values it proclaims.
Over the past few years, a wave of military coups and power grabs has tested the AU’s commitment to its own norms. Since 2020, no fewer than six member states – including Mali, Guinea, Burkina Faso, Niger, Gabon, and (in a different form) Sudan – have been suspended by the AU after their governments were overthrown or dissolved. The AU did the right thing initially by condemning these unconstitutional changes and suspending the juntas from the Union’s activities. But what came after has been far less decisive. The AU’s standard approach has been to urge a quick restoration of civilian rule and set a “transition” timeline for new elections. Yet time and again, those AU decisions and deadlines have been ignored or quietly extended by the coup authorities, with few consequences. For example, in Chad the junta leader simply ignored AU warnings about eligibility for elections; in Mali, Guinea and Burkina, interim regimes have dragged out their transitions beyond the agreed schedules. The AU’s PSC in May 2024 lamented “the deteriorating security situation” in the Sahel and the prolonged transitions, but offered little beyond expressions of concern. No new enforcement actions, no fresh ideas – just communiqués. As a result, “meetings that are nothing more than performative” have become the norm, with a “resultant lack of action” that renders the AU increasingly irrelevant to the situations in the Sahel”. In the blunt assessment of one African policy expert, the AU’s ignored and unimplemented decisions are “pushing the continental body into further irrelevance and lack of credibility.”
The erosion of the AU’s authority on governance issues goes beyond coups. Even under civilian governments, the Union has often turned a blind eye to flawed elections and democratic backsliding. In some cases, AU observer missions have rubber-stamped elections as “credible” despite clear irregularities, seemingly prioritizing stability over integrity. A vivid example occurred in Zimbabwe in the 2000s: the AU (and its sub-regional partner SADC) endorsed election outcomes that many observers and Zimbabwean citizens criticized as fraudulent. Robert Mugabe’s regime – notorious for vote-rigging and repression – even saw Mugabe serve as the African Union chair in 2015. This tendency to prop up or overlook the excesses of longtime incumbents seriously undermines the AU’s moral standing. As one analysis noted, the Arab Spring uprisings of 2011 starkly exposed “the weaknesses in the AU’s normative frameworks” on democracy and human rights, creating a “credibility problem” for the organisation. The people of Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya overthrew dictators – and the AU found itself hesitant and conflicted about whether to side with popular pro-democracy movements or its club of heads of state. Ultimately, the AU acknowledged that coups and uprisings were “deeply rooted in governance deficiencies” and urged leaders to “deepen democracy”, but then did nothing concrete to reform its approach. A similar silence and soft-pedaling has often greeted more subtle erosions of democracy, such as presidents extending term limits or cracking down on opposition. In 2025, criticism was mounting that the AU too readily labels contentious elections as acceptable. (In one case, the AU was rebuked by observers in Burundi for hastily calling an election “credible” despite allegations of fraud – a move that drew public ire for seeming to whitewash undemocratic practices. Such hesitancy to speak out forcefully on electoral fraud or authoritarian drift has tarnished the AU’s reputation as a guarantor of democratic norms. It sends a message that Africa’s highest political body will tolerate undemocratic behavior by its members, so long as powerholders claim a thin veneer of legality.
Why the AU Must Lead: Restoring Credibility and African Agency
The African Union’s founding promise rests on the idea that Africans should be in charge of solving Africa’s problems – in both security and governance. When the AU fails to fulfill this mandate, the consequences are dire. First and foremost, it betrays the aspirations of African citizens who yearn for peace, freedom, and good governance. Africans look to the AU for a “collective voice” and coordinated action in times of crisis. A weak AU response leaves those citizens in the lurch. Moreover, every time the AU stands aside, external powers or domestic strongmen fill the void, often pursuing their own narrow interests. This undermines Africa’s sovereignty and long-term stability. We are already seeing this dynamic play out: foreign governments and private military contractors step into Sahel conflicts, global powers broker deals between African states or armed groups, and emboldened coup leaders dig in their heels, calculating that the AU won’t stop them. If this trend continues, the concept of “African solutions” will ring hollow, and the AU will become a bystander on its own continent.
It is crucial to recognise that African problems require African leadership not because outsiders can never help, but because outsiders will not always prioritise Africa’s interests above their own. As security analysts warn, “external mediation may lead to meddling and thwart the championing of local solutions for local problems.” Qatar’s involvement in the DRC peace talks was constructive, but tomorrow it could be another actor with a less altruistic agenda. The presence of multiple external interests can easily undermine regional efforts and pit African initiatives against one another. The only antidote is strong, unified leadership from the AU that asserts an overarching vision for peace and democratic governance. Indeed, the AU’s own Peace and Security Council has stressed the “centrality of complementarity” – in other words, the need for the AU to work in concert with regional bodies and speak as one – in the spirit of “African solutions to African problems.” Fulfilling that spirit will shore up the AU’s legitimacy in the eyes of Africa’s people and partners.
So how can the African Union turn its rhetoric into reality? To restore its credibility, the AU must proactively and consistently lead on both conflict resolution and governance. This requires more than speeches – it requires reforms, resources, and political will. Below we outline key steps and commitments the AU should embrace as part of an urgent credibility campaign:
Take the Initiative in Peace Mediation: The AU should not wait for others to convene talks on African conflicts. It must deploy its own high-level envoys and offer African venues for negotiations at the earliest sign of crisis. Whether in Congo, Sudan, or Cameroon, the AU should be the one calling rival parties to the table. This might mean empowering the AU Commission or special representatives to broker talks, rather than deferring wholly to regional blocs. When outsiders do get involved, the AU must insist on a seat at the table and a say in the outcomes, to ensure African interests are known. By visibly leading peace processes, the AU can demonstrate it is not sidelined – and can better coordinate support from the United Nations or others under an African-led framework.
Reinvigorate African Peacekeeping and Rapid Response: To back up diplomacy, the AU needs credible peacekeeping and conflict intervention capacity. This means urgently operationalising the long-delayed African Standby Force (ASF) – a continent-wide brigade system that was declared “fully operational” in 2016 but has never been fully utilised. AU leadership in 2025 promised to push for “effective standby forces ready for deployment to conflict areas”. That promise must be kept. A roadmap to reform the ASF is underway, and it should deliver a force that can be rapidly deployed (with the AU’s authorisation) to stabilise crises before they escalate. Equally important is securing sustainable African-Based funding for AU peace operations. Right now, AU missions (like those in Somalia or the Sahel) rely heavily on external donors, which often comes with strings attached. The AU and its member states should invest in a dedicated peace fund so that African peace support operations aren’t at the mercy of outside budgets. A more self-reliant peacekeeping capacity will both enable quicker responses and send a message that Africa is willing to put its money where its mouth is for its own peace.
Stand Firm on Democratic Principles: The AU’s normative frameworks for governance – such as the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance – need to be more than words on paper. The Union should apply these standards impartially, whether the threat to democracy comes from a military coup or an elected president subverting constitutional term limits. Consistent consequences are key. For military juntas, AU suspension must be accompanied by clear red lines (e.g. no AU lifting of suspension without a firm, prompt election timeline agreed) and coordination with regional bodies to avoid undercutting each other. For leaders who obtain or retain power through fraudulent elections, the AU should refuse to legitimise the outcome. Its observer missions should speak the truth about irregularities rather than using diplomatic language to overlook them. If a government flagrantly violates its people’s rights or its own constitution, the AU’s Peace and Security Council should be empowered to issue sanctions or other penalties, not just gentle admonitions. Such firmness would mark a departure from past practice, but it is necessary to rebuild the AU’s reputation as a guardian of responsible, people-centered government. As researchers have noted, current peace and security approaches too often fail to address the “root causes” of instability – notably governance deficits and marginalization. By tackling those root causes head-on – condemning electoral malpractices, protecting civic space, and mediating political disputes before they erupt – the AU can help prevent conflicts before they start.
Engage Citizens and Civil Society: To boost its legitimacy, the AU should better engage the African public on what it is doing and why. Advocacy groups and civic organizations across Africa are natural allies in pushing for peace and good governance – the AU should consult and include them. Regular outreach, inclusive dialogues (for example, inviting civil society input during mediation processes or transition planning), and transparent communication about AU actions would go a long way toward closing the perception gap. When African people see the AU aligning with their aspirations – be it supporting pro-democracy movements or intervening to stop bloodshed – public confidence in the Union will grow. That, in turn, can put pressure on recalcitrant leaders to cooperate with AU initiatives, knowing they are backed by popular support.
In embracing these steps, the African Union would be following through on internal calls for reform. Even within the AU, there is recognition that reform is needed to make the institution more effective and responsive. The new AU Commission Chair, for instance, has argued for a “more proactive Peace and Security Council” and streamlined crisis response tools. Similarly, the AU’s Panel of the Wise and other organs have long stressed preventive diplomacy and early warning. The pieces of the solution are largely known – the challenge is summoning the collective political will of member states to act. It will require strong leadership from key African heads of state and perhaps a new consensus that the old habit of sovereignty-as-non-interference must give way to sovereignty-as-joint-responsibility. After all, every protracted conflict or unconstitutional power grab in one country tends to spill over to the detriment of neighbors. African leaders have much to gain by empowering the AU to address such issues robustly, and much to lose if the AU fades into irrelevance.
Conclusion
The African Union stands at a crossroads. One path leads to further erosion of its credibility – a scenario where the AU continues to issue lofty statements but plays only a minor role in solving Africa’s crises. That path will see more African conflicts outsourced to geopolitical deal-makers, more charters and agreements breached without consequence, and ultimately a loss of faith among African citizens in their Union’s purpose. The other path is one of revitalization and assertive leadership: the AU rededicating itself to keeping peace and enforcing standards of responsible governance across Africa. This path is about action – deploying mediators and peacekeepers, speaking truth to power, and insisting on African-led solutions even when that ruffles political sensitivities. Choosing this path would not be easy, but it is necessary.
The good news is that the AU still has the tools and the mandate to change course. It remains the only institution that convenes all African states under a shared vision of peace, unity, and development. Its Peace and Security Council and various normative instruments give it a framework to act – if backed by the will to implement. And there are success stories to draw inspiration from. For instance, when the AU did take initiative in mediating Kenya’s post-election violence in 2008 or more recently supporting talks to end Ethiopia’s civil war, it showed African diplomacy can deliver results. Such examples must become the rule, not the exception.
Ultimately, the credibility of the African Union must be earned through deeds. Every conflict prevented or peacefully resolved under AU auspices, every unconstitutional power play halted by unified African pressure, every fair election upheld by the AU’s principled stance – these are the victories that will restore faith in the Union. As one security analysis put it, it is vital that the AU “remain relevant in all conflicts and assert its authority in the spirit of the AU Constitutive Act.” That means living up to the values enshrined in its founding documents – from the rejection of violent power seizures to the promotion of human rights and justice. Africa’s people deserve an African Union that meets its responsibilities head-on. By taking the lead on peacekeeping and responsible governance now, the AU can begin to silence the doubters and, more importantly, silence the guns – proving that the African Union truly is the cornerstone of Africa’s peace and progress in the 21st century.
Sources:
Al Jazeera – “DR Congo, M23 rebels sign deal in Qatar to end fighting in eastern Congo” (19 Jul 2025)aljazeera.comaljazeera.com.
ISS Africa – “Stronger internal mediation the antidote to external meddling” (PSC Report, 14 May 2025)issafrica.orgissafrica.org.
Africa Center for Strategic Studies – “Overcoming Challenges to Reform the African Union” (15 Jul 2025)africacenter.org.
Amani Africa – “Is the African Union failing countries in complex political transition?” (Solomon Dersso, 16 Sep 2024)amaniafrica-et.orgamaniafrica-et.org.
ISS Africa – “The African Union’s chequered history with military coups” (L. Louw-Vaudran, 22 Nov 2017)issafrica.orgissafrica.org.
ISS Africa – “New AU leaders must articulate a bold vision for Africa’s peace operations” (15 Apr 2025)issafrica.orgissafrica.org.